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We discuss the possibility of freedom of action in embodied systems that are, with no exception and
at all scales of their body, subject to physical law. We relate the discussion to a model of an artificial
agent that exhibits a primitive notion of creativity and freedom in dealing with its environment,
which is part of a recently introduced scheme of information processing called projective simulation.
This provides an explicit proposal on how we can reconcile our understanding of universal physical
law with the idea that higher biological entities can acquire a notion of freedom that allows them
to increasingly detach themselves from a strict causal embedding into the surrounding world.
INTRODUCTION
Are we free in our decisions and actions? Or is free
will an illusion and is what we think and how we act
entirely determined by the laws of Nature? Recent de-
velopments in brain research have revived and stirred-up
a centuries-old discussion, claiming that free will is es-
sentially an illusion [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. The discussion is not
only of academic nature, but it has for example been
suggested that the experimental findings of the neuro-
sciences, together with their theoretical interpretations,
should be reflected in future jurisdiction [6]. These de-
velopments have lead to a controversial debate between
brain researchers, philosophers, law makers, behavior sci-
entists, and others (see e.g. [7, 8]).
Considering what seems to be at stake, these reac-
tions are not surprising. At the same time, they also
emphasize the deep impact of the concepts and findings
of modern science, in particular physics, neurobiology,
and computer science, on the idea of human existence
and responsibility.
The problem of free will has a long history in philoso-
phy and science. We shall not try to give a full account
of the various philosophical arguments that have been
brought up against or in favor of free will. It seems how-
ever save to say that, up-to-date, the problem of free
will has remained a deeply puzzling problem that many
consider as yet unsolved:
“So it really does look as if everything we
know about physics forces us to some form
of denial of human freedom.”
— John Searle, Minds, Brains and Science,
p. 87 (1984).
This quote, out of a famous lecture by John Searle [9],
dates back more than 25 years, and it addresses a ques-
tion of principle [25]. It seems to us that this problem
should be solved before any interpretation of experimen-
tal findings in the neurosciences (concerning the existence
or non-existence of free will) can be reached.
Indeed, how can we accept, the very possibility of free
will if we assume, at the same time, that we are, with
no exception and at all scales of our body, subject to
physical law? Do we have to assume that the laws of
physics are incomplete and that there are new kinds of
laws waiting to be discovered – maybe on the level of
more complex biological entities – that will ultimately
free us from a strict causal embedding into the evolution
of the physical world?
We will argue in this note that we do not need new
laws to resolve this puzzle. We may still discover new
laws in the future, which will hopefully help us to better
understand the workings of the human mind and all that
comes with it. But I claim we shall not need such laws to
resolve the conundrum of the freedom of action. We can
show, on the basis of physical laws as we understand them
today, that entities with a certain degree of physical or
biological organization, capable of evolving a specific type
of memory, can indeed detach themselves from an strict
causal embedding into the surrounding world and develop
a original notion of creativity and freedom in their dealing
with the environment. Our argument will be based on
the idea of projective simulation which is a new physical
model of information processing for artificial agents that
was recently introduced in [11].
Many philosophers and scientists have addressed the
problem of free will in the past, and have argued for the
possibility of free will. This includes, in particular, a
number of theories and ideas that have been refereed to
as “two-stage models” for free will [12]. At the same time,
the idea of freedom is “under attack as never before” as
was recently observed by neurobiologist Martin Heisen-
berg in an essay to Nature [7]. Are the experimental
findings of modern brain research indeed so compelling
that they could falsify all theories supporting free will?
In this paper, we would like to add another perspective
to this discussion. Rather than discussing the existence
of free will in the context of current brain research, which
we prefer to leave to the experts, we shall present a model
of an artificial agent that exhibits a notion of freedom in
dealing with its environment, which is part of a physi-
cally well-defined scheme of information processing and
learning [11]. This model could in principle be realized,
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2with present-day technology, in artificial agents such as
robots. This demonstrates, first, that a notion of free-
dom can indeed exist for entities that operate, without
exception and at all scales, under the laws of physics. It
also shows that freedom of action can be understood as
an emergent property of biological systems of sufficient
complexity that have evolved a specific form of memory.
Formally, our proposal might be listed under the head-
ing of the two-stage models, but it differs from previous
work in several essential respects.
1. We take an explicit perspective from physics and
information processing. We introduce projective
simulation as a physical concept that gives room
for a notion of freedom compatible with the laws of
physics.
2. Together with the model of episodic and composi-
tional memory, our theory of projective simulation
should allow us to analyze and propose behavior
experiments with simple animals.
3. Our scheme could, in principle, be realized with
present-day technology in form of artificial (learn-
ing) agents or robots.
Finally, we want to emphasize that our model is not
meant to be an “explanation of consciousness” [13], nor
a theory of “how the brain works”. We leave this to the
experts and to the brain researchers, and we are looking
forward to the many new experimental findings and in-
sights that we may expect to learn about in the years to
come. Similarly, we are not claiming that we can explain
the nature of human freedom and conscious choice.
What we can provide, however, is an explicit proposal
on how we can reconcile our understanding of universal
physical law with the idea that higher biological entities
can acquire a notion of freedom. It allows them to de-
tach themselves from an strict causal embedding into the
surrounding world and, at the same time, to truly gener-
ate behavior on their own that is both spontaneous and
meaningful in response to their environment.
MACHINE INTELLIGENCE AND CREATIVITY
If we accept that free will is compatible with physical
law, we also have to accept that it must be possible, in
principle, to build a machine that would exhibit similar
forms of freedom as the one we usually ascribe to humans
and certain animals. It is likely to turn out that the task
of building such a machine will be far too complex to
be realizable in any practical terms, or that it will be
at least as complex as the task (and pleasure) of raising
and educating a human child within society. This ob-
servation, if true, may be disappointing to some people,
but for many of us it has a positive and reconciling as-
pect. On the other hand, it may still be feasible to build
more primitive forms of machines (or agents) that ex-
hibit some rudimentary forms of freedom and creativity
in their behavior.
Computers are special sorts of machines which play an
increasingly important role in our modern society. They
have not only transformed our practical daily life, but
they are also beginning to change the perception of our-
selves from “human subjects” to “information process-
ing systems”. This will ultimately challenge the ques-
tion of human existence and freedom, and all that comes
with it (e.g. social responsibility, the ethics of action, and
so on). Variants of computers are so-called intelligent
agents and robots. They are often viewed (not quite cor-
rectly, though [14]) as computers equipped with some pe-
riphery, including sensors, with which they can perceive
signals from the environment, and actuators, with which
they can act on the environment. Intelligent agents are
designed to operate autonomously in complex and chang-
ing environments, examples of which are traffic, remote
space, or the internet. The design of intelligent agents,
specifically for tasks such as learning, has become a uni-
fying agenda of various branches of artificial intelligence
[15].
Even if we are willing to accept that artificial agents,
and computers in general, may exhibit some form of in-
telligence [26], we would hardly ascribe free will to them.
In return, we would not like ourselves to be identified
with such an agent. What is the reason for this disap-
proval? The main reason seems to be that the agent has a
program which determines, for a given input [27], its next
step of action. Its action is the result of an algorithm: it
is predictable and can e.g. be computed by some other
machine.
The situation does not change fundamentally if the al-
gorithm or program itself is not deterministic, as it is
sometimes considered in computer science, invoking the
notion of probabilistic Turing machines [16]. Even if ran-
domized programs can sometimes increase the efficiency
of certain computations, it is not clear what one should
gain from such randomization in the present context. If,
before, the agent was the slave of a deterministic pro-
gram, it is then the slave of a random program [28]. But
random action is not the same as free action.
The disturbing point with both described variants is
the idea and existence of the program itself. If physics is
looking for the laws of Nature, e.g. for the laws describing
the way how things move and change in space and time,
and of how they respond to our experimental inquiry, a
more computer-science oriented approach looks for the
program behind things, including living beings. Both no-
tions appear to be in fundamental conflict with our basic
idea of freedom.
In this paper, we will however argue that the idea of
being subjected to physical law does not contradict the
possibility of freedom. We will base our argument on the
explicit description of an information processing scheme,
3which we call projective simulation [11], which could be
part of the design of an artificial agent, a robot, or con-
ceivably some biological entity. It combines the concepts
of simulation, episodic memory, and randomness into a
common framework.
MEMORY
A crucial element for the possibility of freedom of ac-
tion is the existence of memory. By memory we mean
any kind of organ, or physical device, that allows the
agent to store and recall information about past experi-
ence. Generally speaking, memory allows the agent to
relate its actions to its past. Memory per se is however
not sufficient for the existence of free will. Elementary
forms of memory exist already in simple animals (reflex-
type agents), as in the roundworm Caenorhabditis ele-
gans, the well-studied sea slug Aplysia [17], or the fruit
fly Drosophila [18], and learning consists in the modifica-
tion and shaping of the molecular details of their neural
circuits due to experience. Nevertheless, we are hesitat-
ing to ascribe a notion of freedom to invertebrates such
as C. elegans or Aplysia, whose actions remain simple
reflexes to environmental stimuli.
The brain of humans and higher primates is of course
much more complex and much less understood. As we
consider the brains of different species, moving from in-
vertebrates to vertebrates including mammals, primates
and the humans, the structure of their brains gets in-
creasingly more sophisticated and complex. But it is al-
ways described by a network of neurons and synapses,
and the basic principles of signal transmission and pro-
cessing seem to be the same. The question then arises:
How can an increasing complexity of a neural network
lead to the emergence of a radically new feature and en-
dow humans or higher primates, and arguably also sim-
pler animals, with “freedom” in their actions?
The answer, it seems, must be sought in the increas-
ingly complex organization of memory. A difference be-
tween the simple memory of Aplysia and the complex
memory of higher vertebrates, is the appearance of dif-
ferent functions of memory. Different from simple an-
imals, a call of memory in humans and primates does
not automatically lead to motor action. This means that
there exists a platform on which memory content can
be reinvoked, which is decoupled from immediate motor
action. The evolutionary emergence of such a platform
means that an agent with more complex memory can be-
come increasingly detached from immediate response to
environmental stimuli.
However, the actions of the agent still remain deter-
mined by the memory content, which itself was formed
by the agent’s percept history. In other words, the ac-
tions of the agent remain determined by its past, and
there is no real notion of freedom. What is still missing
is an element of spontaneity in the agent’s response to a
given environmental situation. If C elegans is enslaved by
the present stimuli, a more complex agent remains still
enslaved by its past, i.e., the history of its stimuli. How
could Nature get rid of such a time-delayed enslavery?
A possibility to break determinism is to introduce in-
determinism (i.e. genuine randomness). But, as we have
discussed earlier, it is not clear what the effect of ran-
domization should be. If we adopt a computational or
algorithmic view of the brain, we will not change any-
thing. However, the effect of indeterminism depends on
the nature of the processing and memory where it occurs.
We will show that it can indeed have a positive effect on
the agent, not in the sense of making some “computa-
tions” more efficient, but in the sense of introducing an
element of creative variation in its memory-driven inter-
actions with the environment. Here it will be expedient
to abandon the picture of the brain as a computer and, in-
stead, propose a dynamic model of memory which is fully
embedded in the agent’s architecture and which grows as
the agent interacts with the world.
In the next section, we will discuss an abstract scheme
of memory processing which we call projective simula-
tion. It operates entirely under the principles of physics
but nevertheless exhibits an element of freedom in an
agent’s interaction with the environment. It is not clear
whether this scheme is at all implemented in a real brain,
but we claim that it could be realized, in principle, in ar-
tificial agents.
PROJECTIVE SIMULATION
In Ref. [11], we considered a standard model of an arti-
ficial agent that is equipped with sensors and actuators,
through which it can perceive its environment and act
upon it, respectively. Internally, the agent has access
to some kind of memory, which we shall describe below.
Perceptual input can either lead to direct motor action
(reflex-type scenario) or it first undergoes some process-
ing (projective simulation) in the course of which it is
related to memory.
The memory itself is of a specific type, which we call
episodic & compositional memory (ECM). Its primary
function is to store past experience of the agent in the
form of episodes, which are (evaluated) sequences of re-
membered percepts and actions. Physically, ECM can be
described as a stochastic network of clips, where clips are
the basic units of episodic memory [29], corresponding to
very short episodes (or patches of “space-time memory”)
[11].
The process of projective simulation can be described
as follows. Triggered by perceptual input, some specific
clip in memory, which relates to the input, is excited (or
“activated”), as indicated in Figure 1. This active clip
will then, with a certain probability, excite some neigh-
4Figure 1: Model of episodic memory as a network of clips.
Triggered by perceptual input, the process of projected sim-
ulation starts a random walk through episodic memory, in-
voking patchwork-like sequences of virtual experience. Once
a certain feature is detected, the random walk stops and is
translated into motor action (See also Ref. [11]).
boring clip, leading to a transition within the clip net-
work. As the process continues, it will generate a random
sequence of excited clips, which can be regarded as a re-
call and random reassembly of episodic fragments from
the agent’s past [30]. This process stops once an excited
clip couples out of memory and triggers motor action.
The last step could be realized by a mechanism where
the excited clips are screened for the presence of certain
features. When a specific feature is detected in a clip
(or it is above a certain “intensity” level) it will, with a
certain probability, lead to motor action.
The decribed process is the basic version of episodic mem-
ory, but it is not the only one. In a more refined version,
which we called episodic and compositional memory, we
consider not only transitions between existing clips, but
clips may themselves be randomly created (and varied),
as part of the simulation process itself. Random clip
sequences that are generated this way may introduce
entirely fictitious episodes that never happened in the
agent’s past.
The random walk in memory space, as described, con-
stitutes part of what we call projective simulation. In
another part, the agent’s actions that come out of the
simulation are evaluated. The result of this evaluation
then feeds back into the details of the network struc-
ture of episodic memory, leading to an update of transi-
tion probabilities and of “emotion tags” associated with
certain clip transitions [11]. In a simple reinforcement
setting, one assumes for example that certain actions or
percept-action pairs are rewarded. Learning then takes
place by modifying the network of clips (ECM) according
to the given rewards. This modification of memory oc-
curs in different ways: by bayesian updating of transition
probabilities between existing clips; by adding new clips
to the network via new perceptual input; by creating new
clips from existing ones under certain compositional and
variational principles; and by updating emotional tags
associated with certain clip transitions. Details of this
scheme are given in Ref. [11].
Figure 2: Sequences of percepts and actions are simulated
stochastically by variations and compositions of episodic
memory (ECM), before real action is taken. Through the
process of projective simulation, the agent is, in a sense, con-
stantly ahead of itself.
In the following, coming back to the main topic of this
paper, we want to relate the projective structure of the
agent’s behavior to the emergence of a primitive notion
of creativity and freedom. The basic idea is that the
episodic memory provides a platform for the agent to
“play with” previous experience, before concrete action
is taken (see Figure 2). A call of episodic memory ini-
tiates a random walk through memory space, invoking
patchwork-like sequences of past experience. This can
be understood as a simulation of plausible future expe-
rience on the basis of past experience. It is a simulation
because it takes place only in the agent’s memory; it
simulates plausible future experience because sequences
of episodes that occurred frequently in the past will do
so in simulation. Furthermore, the possibility of clip
composition allows the agent to explore, as part of the
simulation, new fictitious episodic sequences that it has
never encountered before, but which are within a range
of “conceivability” (as defined by the rules of clip compo-
sition). It is important to realize that, in a similar way
as clips representing “real” experience, the clips repre-
senting “fictitious” experience will trigger factual action
through the same mechanism. This means that fictitious
experience, created within the memory of the agent, may
de facto change and guide the real actions of the agent.
One could also say that the agent acts under the influence
of “ideas” that are generated by the agent itself.
In summary, through the process of projected simula-
tion the agent projects itself into conceivable future sit-
5uations and takes its actions under the influence of these
projections, as it is illustrated in Figure 2. In this sense,
the agent is no longer enslaved by its past, but plays with
it, deliberated by variations and spontaneous composi-
tions of episodic fragments. These fragments may come
from the past, but they are transformed, by random pro-
cesses, into new patterns for future action. The agent is,
in this sense, always ahead of itself (see discussion in the
next section).
DISCUSSION
In this section, we want to put the presented scheme
into a broader philosophical context and discuss its rela-
tion to the problem of free will.
The problem of free will is often discussed in the con-
text of conscious human experience [10], specifically when
we experience the freedom of choice between different
options, say, of choosing between different meals in an
restaurant. The problem then consists in an apparent
inconsistency between such conscious experience of free-
dom, on the one hand, and the assumption that all of our
conscious experiences are ultimately determined by neu-
robiological processes in the brain and as such subject to
the laws of physics and biochemistry.
Other scientists see the problem of freedom already
arise, perhaps in a more rudimentary form, on the level
of creatures that may not be conscious, but to which we
would nevertheless ascribe a measure of initiative and
self-determination in their behavior. As Martin Heisen-
berg puts it in Ref. [7]: “Some define freedom as the abil-
ity to consciously decide how to act. I maintain that we
need not be conscious of our decision making to be free.
What matters is that our actions are self generated.”
Whatever definition one chooses, both notions of free-
dom, be it in the sense of conscious free choice or in
the sense of self-generated (and rational) action, have to
be reconciled with the basic assumption that biological
agents - conscious or unconscious - are, without excep-
tion and at all scales of their bodies, subject to physical
law. The fundamental problem is, in both cases, how
genuine notions of freedom can emerge from lawful pro-
cesses. Both the freedom of self-generated action and
the freedom of conscious choice require, at a certain level
(e.g. in the brain), some notion of room to manoeuvre
[10], which is consistent with physical law. Where does
this room come from? And how can it be realized within
an explicit physical model?
In this paper, we have discussed a model of an artifi-
cial agent, where such room for manoeuvre [31] is pro-
vided by a specific notion of memory (ECM) and the
way how this memory is used via projected simulation
of future actions. Room and ultimately freedom arises
in two ways, first by the existence of a simulation plat-
form, which enables the agent to detach itself from an
immediate causal embedding into its environment and,
second, by the constitutive processes of the simulation,
which generate a space of possibilities for responding to
environmental stimuli. The mechanisms that allow the
agent to explore this space of possibilities are based on
random processes. The concept of projective simulation
thus combines the basic notions of memory, randomness,
and simulation in a unique way. In the remainder of this
paper, we would like to come back to these ingredients of
our scheme and comment on their specific role regarding
the origin of freedom.
Memory. The existence of memory is required in a triv-
ial sense, as a physical notion of experience. But memory
also provides the first step to deliberate a system from its
environment, i.e. from an immediate stimulus-reflex-type
embedding into the world. By connecting perceptual in-
put with memory content, the agent is able to relate it
to past experience, on the basis of which it finds its next
step. This endows the system with a comprehensive way
of responding to environmental input, but its responses
are still fully determined by past experience. In the spe-
cific context of episodic memory this means that, as long
as episodes are simply recalled without further modifica-
tion, the agent remains caught by its past and will simply
repeat old patterns of behavior. What is still missing, is
the notion of the new.
The seed of the new is provided by introducing ele-
ments of variation and composition into the simulation
process. The first kind of variation is provided by a ran-
dom reshuffling of past episodes, realized by a random
walk in clip space. While this will already lead to new
patterns of behavior, the space of possibilities is still de-
fined by past experience alone. The second kind of varia-
tion is based on clip composition, which is able to create
new fictitious episodes. It is important to realize that
these variations are truly generated by the agent itself.
The connection of the agent with its own past is thereby
loosened and the agent becomes further “emancipated”
from the environment. However, the agent’s connection
with the past is not simply blurred or erased, as it would
be the case for an arbitrary randomization of memory.
This would be a silly form of emancipation, depriving
the system of what it may have learnt before. Instead,
the agent still makes use of past experience, but it is no
longer caught or enslaved by it. It rather “plays” with its
experience in a constructive sense, creating fictitious se-
quences of action to guide its future actions. This type of
simulation process is conservative in the sense that only
variations around real (and proven) experience are con-
sidered. It is the range of those variations that defines the
conceivable. The probability of variations is determined
by certain rules of clip composition, i.e. how memory con-
tent can mutate or, more generally, transform during the
simulation process [32]. It is a stochastic process that
originates and operates entirely within the memory sys-
tem. In this sense, the deliberation of the agent is truly
6self-generated and, as such, represents a step of emanci-
pation from its surrounding world.
Randomness. The notions of indeterminism and ran-
domness play an important role in our discussion. Ran-
dom processes have been assumed as part of projective
simulation, both in basic memory recall –a random walk
through a space of episodes– and in the mutation or com-
positional processes of individual clips [33]. The reader
may wonder how we can postulate random processes as
part of our physical model. However, this is in fact a
very natural assumption, which is in agreement with the
fundamental (i.e. quantum mechanical) laws of nature.
Truly random processes are generated routinely in mod-
ern quantum physics laboratories, e.g. for quantum infor-
mation processing purposes. But also in biological sys-
tems, random processes are omnipresent, a fact which
has recently been emphasized in Ref. [7]. In neural net-
works in the brain, for example, fluctuations in the elec-
tric potential across the neuron membrane are caused
by fluctuations in the number of ions that cross the ion
channels. These result from the interaction of the ions
with the molecular potential of channel protein, which is
described by quantum mechanics. This means that quan-
tum mechanical indeterminism, which is a fundamental
and irreducible property of molecular systems interacting
with an environment, leads to fluctuations and random
noise in the entire network activity. Although, for prac-
tical considerations, the origin of noise is usually not im-
portant, it is here a matter of principle. In other words:
We may not need quantum mechanics to understand the
principles of projective simulation, but we have it. And
this is our safeguard that ensures true indeterminism on
a molecular level, which is amplified to random noise on
a higher level. Quantum randomness is truly irreducible
and provides the seed for genuine spontaneity [34].
One should also realize that the question of principle
of the possibility of free will on the basis of natural law
does not depend on specifics of neurobiology. Even if
people doubt the relevance of quantum indeterminacy
in biological agents, they must face the possibility that
sooner or later mankind may build artificial intelligent
agents that will use quantum elements as part of their
design. To put it provocatively, even if human freedom
were to be an illusion, humans would still be able, in
principle, to build free robots. Amusing.
Finally, one might ask why randomness in our model
of projective simulation is different from randomness in
any other computational model, e.g. a boolean circuit.
Why is it any better to be the slave of a random “mu-
tation of clips” than of some “randomized algorithm”?
The answer is that, in the model of projective simula-
tion, there is a clear functional role of randomness, which
introduces variations around established patterns of be-
havior. It is on the background of previous experience,
where variations make proper sense and allow the agent
to explore new possibilities via simulation, i.e. before
trying them out. This is not a notion of slavery but of
self-generated choice. In contrast, randomization of an
algorithm given e.g. in form of some Boolean circuit may
completely change the meaning and function of the al-
gorithm and thus introduce truly meaningless variations
[35]. It is thus not randomness per se that leads to delib-
eration or freedom. It is the (room for) variation relative
to past experience that establishes a meaningful notion
of choice.
Simulation. The physical process of simulation, com-
bining randomness and episodic memory to generate
“virtual experience”, results in a projective structure of
the agent’s behavior in its interaction with the world,
as illustrated in Figure 2. The agent takes actions un-
der the influence of its own projections and is, in this
sense, constantly ahead of itself. It is worth pointing out
that this resembles a fundamental structure (the existen-
tiale Entwurf ) in Heidegger’s phenomenology [20], which
plays an constitutive role for the notion of human under-
standing and being-in-the-world. The latter provides an
interesting but different framework for the discussion of
human freedom, which lies much beyond the scope of the
current paper. Clearly, in the present discussion we are
not talking about conscious agents nor about any deeper
aspect of human existence. What is remarkable, however,
is that one of the fundamental structures of phenomenol-
ogy can be brought in close connection with basic notions
of modern physics and science [21]. It seems to us that
a careful analysis of human (and animal) behavior, both
from the perspective of phenomenology and of develop-
mental psychology [24], may indeed offer new ideas to-
wards a better understanding of artificial intelligence [36]
and the ultimate possibilities of “information processing”
in biological agents.
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